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Analytical sociology is a middle-range approach to sociological theorizing which seeks to
develop precise and realistic action-based explanations of various social phenomena. At
the heart of the analytical approach is the idea that acceptable explanations must detail the
mechanisms through which the phenomena to be explained were brought about. In this arti-
cle I discuss the most important elements of this approach and I try to illustrate the vari-
ous components involved in an explanation of social change. The analytical approach
adopted here seeks to closely integrate mechanism-based theories of action and interac-
tion, and agent-based computational modelling. The article is organized in the following
way: first I present the guiding ideas behind the mechanisms approach. Second I discuss var-
ious mechanisms of action and interaction to illustrate what it is all about. Third I use a so-
called agent-based model for illustrating how one can link individual-level mechanisms to
social outcomes. Fourth I show how important it is to empirically calibrate these types of
models. And fifth, and finally, I round it all up with some concluding remarks.
Key words: social change, social mechanisms, analytical sociology, social interaction, social
simulation.
Resumen. Explicando el cambio social: un enfoque analítico
La sociología analítica es una aproximación a la teorización social «de alcance intermedio»
que persigue desarrollar explicaciones precisas, realistas y basadas en la acción acerca de diver-
sos fenómenos sociales. En el núcleo del enfoque analítico se encuentra la idea de que las
explicaciones aceptables deben detallar los mecanismos a través de los cuales se produjeron
los fenómenos a explicar. En este artículo discuto los elementos más importantes de este
enfoque e intento ilustrar los diversos componentes que integran la explicación del cambio
social. El enfoque analítico adoptado aquí busca integrar estrechamente las teorías de la acción
y la interacción basadas en mecanismos con los modelos computacionales basados en agentes.
El artículo se organiza de la siguiente manera: primero, presento las ideas-guía que subyacen
al enfoque de los mecanismos. Segundo, discuto varios mecanismos de acción e interacción
con objeto de ilustrar cómo funciona el enfoque. Tercero, utilizo un modelo basado en la
agencia para ilustrar cómo pueden vincularse los mecanismos de nivel individual con los
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Papers 80 001-312  13/12/06  10:52  Página 74resultados sociales. Cuarto, muestro lo importante que resulta el calibrar empíricamente este
tipo de modelos. Y, quinto y último, redondeo todo lo anterior con unas observaciones finales.
Palabras clave: cambio social, mecanismos sociales, sociología analítica, interacción social,
simulación social.
Introduction
The history of analytical sociology can be traced back to the works of Max
Weber and Alexis de Tocqueville, and the analytical agenda was further devel-
oped by prominent mid-twentieth-century sociologists such as Robert Merton.
Only in recent decades, however, has a clearly articulated analytical sociology
started to emerge. This type of sociology seeks to explain complex social process-
es by carefully dissecting them and then bringing into focus their most impor-
tant constituent components. Analytical sociology is a middle-range approach
to sociological theorizing which seeks to develop precise and realistic action-
based explanations of various social phenomena.
At the heart of the analytical approach is the idea that acceptable explana-
tions must detail the mechanisms through which the phenomena to be
explained were brought about. This means that one must clearly explicate the
relevant mechanisms, and then seek to derive the social phenomena that groups
of actors, acting on the basis of such mechanisms, are likely to bring about.
In this article I discuss the most important elements of this approach1. The
article is organized in the following way:
— First I present the guiding ideas behind the mechanisms approach.
— Second I discuss various mechanisms of action and interaction to illustrate
what it is all about.
— Third I use a so-called agent-based model for illustrating how one can link
individual-level mechanisms to social outcomes.
— Fourth I show how important it is to empirically calibrate these types of
models.
— And fifth, and finally, I round it all up with some concluding remarks.
1. Needless to say, given the constraints imposed by the article format, the discussion will be
rather brief. For a detailed account, see Hedström (2005).
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One way of identifying the distinguishing characteristics of the mechanism
approach is to compare it with other explanatory approaches (see Table 1).
The most important alternatives to the mechanism approach are the cover-
ing-law approach of Hempel and other philosophers (e.g., 1965), and the
statistical approach of many quantitatively oriented social scientists (for a dis-
cussion of the logic of statistical explanations, see e.g., King, Keohane and
Verba 1994; Lazarsfeld 1955; Salmon 1971).
While the covering-law approach takes the position that an acceptable
explanation consists in subsuming the event to be explained under a general
causal law, the statistical approach, explicitly or implicitly, sets an equal sign
between explanation and predictive accuracy; a variable is said to be explana-
tory if it is statistically relevant for the event to be explained. In contrast to
these approaches, the core idea behind the mechanism approach is that we
deductively explain a social phenomenon by referring to a basic constellation
of entities and activities that are spatially and temporally organized in such a
way that they regularly bring about the type of phenomena we seek to explain
(see Hedström and Swedberg 1998; Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000).
We explain an observed phenomenon by referring to the social mechanism by
which such phenomena are regularly brought about.
From the view point of sociology, Hempel’s approach is of limited rele-
vance because, as far as we know, there exist no strict Hempelian laws in soci-
ology and there are good reasons to suspect that such laws do not exist. The
statistical approach, as practiced by most quantitative sociologists, is wanting
for another reason. As argued by Boudon (1979), Coleman (1986), Goldthorpe
(2000), and others, statistical analyses summarize patterns in data, they do
not explain them. From the mechanism perspective, correlations and con-
stant conjunctions do not explain but are observational phenomena that needs
to be explained by reference to the mechanisms that brought them into exis-
tence.
Table 1. Main types of explanations.
Covering-law Statistical Mechanism
explanations explanations explanations
Explanatory To subsume under To identify statistically To specify a social 
principle a causal law relevant factors mechanism
Key No restrictions, except No restrictions, Actors, actions,
explanatory that the factor must except that the factor and the way in
factors, entities exhibit a law-like must be statistically which these are
and/or relation to the event relevant for the event temporally and
activities to be explained to be explained spatially organized
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In sociology the basic entities of a mechanism always tend to be actors, and
the basic activities tend to be the actions of these actors. Through their actions
actors make society «tick,» and without their actions social processes would
come to a halt. Theories of action are therefore of fundamental importance
for explanatory sociological theories, but how should we go about conceptu-
alizing action and interaction? In my view, the most attractive alternative is
the so-called DBO theory. According to this theory, desires (D), beliefs (B),
and opportunities (O) are the primary theoretical terms upon which the analy-
sis of action and interaction is based. That is to say, the desires, beliefs, and
opportunities of an actor are seen as the proximate causes of the actor’s action
(see Figure 1).
We can understand why actors do what they do if we perceive of their
behaviour as being endowed with meaning, that is, that there is an intention
explaining why they do what they do (see Elster 1983a; von Wright 1971).
As seen in Figure 1, these intentions in turn can be understood in terms of
the desires, beliefs, and opportunities of the actor. A desire here is defined as
a wish or want for something to happen (or not to happen). A belief is defined
as a proposition about the world held to be true. And, opportunities, as the
term is used here, is the «menu» of action alternatives available to the actor,
that is, the actual set of action alternatives that exists independently of the
actor’s beliefs about them (for discussions of various aspects of the DBO theory,
see Davidson 1980; Elster 1989; Hahn 1973; Lewis 1994).
Beliefs and desires thus are mental events that can be said to cause an action
in the sense of providing reasons for the action. A particular combination of
desires and beliefs constitutes a «compelling reason» for performing an action.
They have a motivational force that allows us to understand and, in this respect,
explain the action (see von Wright 1989).
The causal efficacy of beliefs, desires, and opportunities, can be illustrated
by the following set of everyday examples focusing on the reasons why Mr.
Smith did not bring an umbrella today. There are three ideal-typical explanations:
— Belief-based explanation: Mr. Smith desires not to get wet and he had an
umbrella that he could have brought, but by mistake he read yesterday’s
Figure 1. Core components of the DBO theory.
Desires of actor i
Beliefs of actor i
Intention
of actor i
Action of
actor i
Opportunities of actor i
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Therefore he did not bring an umbrella today.
— Desire-based explanation: Mr. Smith believed that it would rain today and
he had an umbrella that he could have brought, but Mr. Smith has some-
what unusual desires: Walking in heavy rain always makes him feel like
Gene Kelly in Singin’ in the Rain, and feeling like Gene Kelly is something
he really desires. Therefore he did not bring an umbrella today.
— Opportunity-based explanation: Mr. Smith believed that it would rain today
and he had a strong desire not to get wet, but when he was leaving for
work in the morning he found that his son had taken his umbrella and
there were no other umbrella in the house. Therefore he did not bring an
umbrella today.
In order to explain why we observe what we observe, we also must seek to
understand how beliefs, desires, and opportunities are formed in interactions
with others. Simply assuming that beliefs and desires are fixed and unaffect-
ed by the actions of others may be plausible in some very specific situations, but
it would be an untenable assumption in the general case. Therefore, we must
problematize and try to specify the mechanisms through which the actions of
some actors may come to influence the beliefs, desires, opportunities, and
actions of others2.
There are numerous ways to conceptualize social-interaction processes, but
from the perspective of the DBO theory it appears essential to distinguish
between three broad types of social interactions: (1) desire-mediated; (2) belief-
mediated; and (3) opportunity-mediated interactions. In the dyadic case we
can describe the interaction between two actors as in the Figure 23.
To the extent that the action of one actor, here referred to as Actor i, influ-
ences the action of another, Actor j, this influence must be mediated via the
action opportunities or mental states of Actor j. In terms of the DBO theory,
the action (or behaviour) of Actor i can influence the desires, the beliefs, or
the opportunities of Actor j and thereby the actions of j4.
Using the basic concepts of the DBO theory —desires, beliefs, opportu-
nities, actions, and relations— more complex «molecular» mechanisms can be
defined. These molecular mechanisms differ from one another in terms of
how these basic entities and activities are temporally and spatially organized.
2. I will have little to say about the specifics of these beliefs and desires —whether, for exam-
ple, one individual desires or believes p rather than q. The type of interaction mechanisms
that I focus on are of a more general kind and deal with the centripetal forces that tend to
make interacting individuals coalesce around a certain p or a certain q whatever that p or q
may be.
3. To simplify the presentation I have removed the «intention box» from the figure, but it is
still assumed that intentions intervene between desires, beliefs, and opportunities, on the one
hand, and actions, on the other.
4. It is important to note that in many situations, «Actor i» may not be a single actor but a
small group of actors with whom j interacts, or a «generalized other» representing typical
actions as perceived by Actor j.
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desires, beliefs, opportunities, and actions, and the letters i, j, and k identify
different actors.
The first pattern of entities and activities exemplifies wishful thinking. As
the term is used here, wishful thinking denotes a causal connection from an
actor’s desires to his/her beliefs that makes the actor believe what (s)he desires
to be the case (see Davidson 1980). The second type of mechanism, the sour-
grapes syndrome exemplifies the opposite causal direction. That is to say, it is
a causal connection from an actor’s beliefs to his/her desires, which makes the
actor desire only what (s)he believes (s)he can get (see Elster 1983b).
The third type of mechanism, dissonance-driven desire formation, is a case
where the actions of others lead to a change in the focal actor’s desires and
thereby to a change in his/her actions. A classic example is Festinger (1957)
and his notion of cognitive dissonance. For example, if I desire p but the peo-
ple I interact with do not, this may cause strong dissonance, particularly if the
desire is important to me and I value the relationship with these people. One
way to eliminate the dissonance would be to persuade them of the value of p.
Another, and often easier, way to reduce the dissonance would be to ‘persuade’
oneself that p after all was not as desirable as one initially thought.
The fourth mechanism, rational-imitation, is the case where one actor’s
action influences the beliefs and subsequent actions of others. For example:
The number of guests at a restaurant is likely to influence other individuals’
choice of restaurant because the number of guests is a signal about the quali-
ty of the restaurant likely to influence the beliefs and actions of others (see
Hedström 1998).
The fifth mechanism, vacancy chains, is a pattern where actions of some
create new opportunities and changes in the actions of others. A classic exam-
ple is Harrison White’s (1970) analysis of the vacancy-driven mobility pattern
in US clergy. An important feature of job mobility within organizations, cap-
Figure 2. Dyadic interaction between Actor i and Actor j according to the DBO theory.
Action or behavior
of actor i
Desires of
actor j
Beliefs of
actor j
Action of
actor j
Opportunities
of actor j
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the number of vacant jobs. Vacancies are created either when individuals leave
their organizations or when new positions are created. When an individual
fills a vacancy, a new vacancy is created in that person’s old job, and this rep-
resents a mobility opportunity to others. One of these people will get the job
and the vacancy will disappear, but a new vacancy has now been created in
this person’s old job. Individuals and vacancies thus move in different direc-
tions, and the mobility process is governed by these chains of opportunity.
Figure 3. Examples of some action- and interaction-related mechanisms.
Entities and activities: Temporal and spatial pattern: Type of mechanism:
Mental states, Wishful thinking.
opportunities, See e.g. Davidson (1980)
and actions of
a single individual
– « – Sour-grapes syndrome.
See e.g. Elster (1983b)
Mental states, Dissonance-driven
opportunities, and desire formation.
actions of two or more See e.g. Festinger (1957)
individuals
– » – Rational-imitation.
See e.g. Hedström
(1998)
– « – Vacancy chain.
See e.g. White (1970)
– » – Self-fulfilling prophecy.
See e.g. Merton (1968).
– « – The »Old Regime»
pattern. See Tocqueville
(1998)
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nation of several rational-imitation mechanisms. Merton (1968) focused on
the case in which an initially false belief evokes behaviour that eventually
makes the false belief come true. The example he used is a run on a bank.
Once a rumour of insolvency gets started, some depositors are likely to with-
draw their savings, acting on the principle that it is better to be safe than sorry.
Their withdrawals strengthen the beliefs of others that the bank is in finan-
cial difficulties, partly because the withdrawals may actually hurt the financial
standing of the bank, but more importantly because the act of withdrawal in
itself signals to others that something might be wrong with the bank. This
produces even more withdrawals, which further strengthens the belief, and so
on. By this mechanism, even an initially sound bank may go bankrupt if
enough depositors withdraw their money in the (initially) false belief that the
bank is insolvent.
The seventh and final mechanism in Figure 3, the «Old Regime» pattern,
is a sequential concatenation of rational-imitation and dissonance-driven desire-
formation mechanisms (D’i→ Ai→ Bj→ Aj→ Di→ Ai where D’i ≠ Di).
For opportunistic reasons one actor decides to do something (s)he does not
genuinely desire. The action is observed by others and the rational-imitation
mechanism makes them follow suit. Eventually this feeds back on the first
actor: The actions of others produce dissonance and a change in the desires
of the first actor which makes him or her genuinely desire what (s)he initial-
ly only pretended to do. A mechanism like this was used by Tocqueville to
explain the rapid secularization that took place in France at the end of the
eighteenth century:
Those who retained their belief in the doctrines of the Church became afraid
of being alone in their allegiance and, dreading isolation more than the stigma of
heresy, professed to share the sentiment of the majority. So what was in rea-
lity the opinion of only a part (though a large one) of the nation came to be
regarded as the will of all and for this reason seemed irresistible even to those
who had given it this false appearance. (Tocqueville 1998:155)
Why, then, is it so important to specify the mechanisms that are supposed
to have generated observed outcomes? From the perspective of sociological
theory, one important reason for insisting on a detailed specification of mech-
anisms is that it tends to produce precise and intelligible explanations with-
out glaring black boxes (see Boudon 1998). Another important reason is that
a focus on mechanisms tends to reduce theoretical fragmentation. For exam-
ple, we may have numerous different theories (of crime, social movements, or
whatnot), that are all based on the same set of mechanisms of action and inter-
action. Focusing on the mechanisms as such avoids unnecessary proliferation
of theoretical concepts and may help in bringing out structural similarities
between seemingly disparate processes. Finally, it is the knowledge that the
type of outcome we seek to explain regularly is brought about by the entities
and activities referred to in the mechanism that gives us reason to believe that
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effect, and not simply a spurious correlation.
Analyzing the link between the individual and the social
To understand why actors do what they do is not sufficient, however; we must
also address the question of why, acting as they do, they bring about the social
outcomes they do. Sociology is not a discipline concerned with explaining the
actions of single individuals. The focus on actions is merely an intermediate
step in an explanatory strategy that seeks to understand change at a social level.
As the term is used here, the «social» refers to collective properties that are
not definable for a single member of the collectivity (see also Carlsson 1968).
Important examples of such phenomena include:
— typical actions, beliefs, desires etc. among the members of the collectivity;
— distributions and aggregate patterns such as spatial distributions and inequal-
ities;
— topologies of networks that describe relationships between the members
of the collectivity; and
— informal rules or social norms that constrain the actions of the members
of the collectivity.
Social outcomes like these are emergent phenomena. With emergent phe-
nomena I am not referring to any mystic holistic entities with their own causal
powers, but simply to social phenomena that are brought about as an unin-
tended by-product of the actions of interacting individuals. Social outcomes,
like other emergent phenomena, are difficult to anticipate because the out-
come depends to a high degree on how the individual parts are interrelated
(see e.g., Holland 1998). Small and seemingly unimportant changes in the
way in which actors are interrelated can have profound consequences for
the social outcomes that are likely to emerge because the links between the
actors influence the extent to which a belief, desire, or social practice spreads
through a population (see e.g., Watts and Strogatz 1998 for some striking
examples). For this reason, social outcomes cannot simply be «read off» from
the properties of the individuals that generate them. In order to explain the
social phenomena we observe, we need to develop generative models that show
how large numbers of actors, in interaction with one another, over time bring
about different types of social outcomes.
Until fairly recently the type of generative model used for addressing the
link between the individual and the social was some sort of stylized mathe-
matical model (see Edling 2002 for an overview). One fundamental problem
with many of these models is that they force the analyst to introduce know-
ingly false assumptions because otherwise the model cannot be solved, and a
mathematical model that cannot be solved is not of much use. Such models
can be extremely elegant and sometimes they represent remarkable intellectual
achievements, but it is questionable whether they can be said to explain any-
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nations of social phenomena always must account for what happens, as it
happens, not as it could have happened in a fictional world very different
from our own.
Agent-based modelling is important as a tool for analyzing these links
between the individual and the social because of its flexibility. Unlike tradi-
tional mathematical models they do not force the analyst to base the analysis
on knowingly false assumptions. The basic idea behind agent-based model-
ling simply is to create a set of virtual actors that act and interact according to
known principles, and then use computer simulations to examine the social
outcomes they bring about (for an overview of the relevant literature on agent-
based modelling, see Macy and Willer 2002). Coleman’s (1986) so-called
micro-macro graph can be used for describing the role of mechanisms and
agent-based modelling in explaining social phenomena (see Figure 4).
As mentioned above, as sociologists we are typically not concerned with
explaining the actions or behaviours of single individuals. The focus is on larg-
er-scale social phenomena characterizing groups of actors, collectivities, or soci-
eties at large; that is to say, the focus of interest in on the upper level of the
Coleman graph. But the properties of these social phenomena and changes in
them over time must always be explained with reference to individuals’ actions,
since it is individuals, not social entities, which are endowed with causal pow-
ers. Simply correlating social phenomena with one another (arrow 4) leads to
superficial causal accounts since such exercises do not explicate the generative
mechanisms believed to be at work. In order to explain we must try to show how
social phenomena influence individuals’ beliefs, desires, opportunities etc
(arrow 1), how these mental states and opportunities influence individuals’
actions (arrow 2), and how actors, through their actions, bring about the social
phenomena we seek to explain (arrow 3).
Some of the mechanisms discussed above were concerned with how indi-
viduals’ desires, beliefs, and opportunities are influenced by the social contexts
in which the actors are embedded (arrow 1). Other mechanisms were con-
Figure 4. Coleman’s micro-macro graph.
Social
Individual
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another, influence actions (arrow 2). Agent-based modelling is used for analysing
the link between individual actions and social outcomes (arrow 3). That is to
say, agent-based modelling is a tool we use for assessing the social outcomes
that groups of interacting actors are likely to bring about given the logics of
action and interaction expressed in the social mechanisms. We need tools like
these because the processes we focus on are so complex that we cannot estab-
lish the social outcomes that are likely to be brought about unless we use such
generative models.
How would then an agent-based model founded on the DBO theory look
like? As discussed above, the cause of an action can be seen as a constellation
of desires, beliefs, and opportunities in the light of which the action appears rea-
sonable. If we simplify the notion of desires and beliefs in such a way that they
can either be said to be or not to be at hand, the possible patterns of desires,
beliefs, opportunities, and actions can be described as in Table 2.
An entry of 1 here indicates the presence of the relevant desire, belief,
opportunity, or action, and an entry of 0 indicates its absence. The third pat-
tern, for instance, represents a situation where an actor desires a certain outcome
and has the opportunity to perform the relevant action, but does not believe
that the action will bring about the desired outcome, and therefore decides
not to act.
Of these eight possible DBO-patterns, only the first one will bring about
an action, because only in this situation does the actor have the opportunity to
act in a way that (s)he believes will bring about the desired outcome.
In order to simplify the presentation, I will focus exclusively on the first
four patterns in the table, i.e., I will assume that all actors have the opportu-
nity to act. The agent-based simulation can be characterized in the following
way. It focuses on the desires, beliefs, and actions of 2,500 actors that are sit-
uated on a lattice with 50 rows and 50 columns. At each point in time the rel-
evant properties of an actor can be described in terms of a desire-belief-action
triplet, <D,B,A>. If the first entry of the triplet is equal to one, the actor is
said to have a «positive» desire, and if the second entry is equal to one the actor
Table 2. DBO-patterns and associated courses of action.
Pattern Desire Belief Opportunity Action
(1) 1 1 1 1
(2) 0 1 1 0
(3) 1 0 1 0
(4) 0 0 1 0
(5) 1 1 0 0
(6) 0 1 0 0
(7) 1 0 0 0
(8) 0 0 0 0
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the third entry will also become equal to one because actors act when they
believe that the action will bring about the desired outcome.
We start from a «state of nature» in which the actors’ beliefs and desires
exhibit no social patterning whatsoever —they are entirely random. A typical
initial pattern of desires, beliefs, and actions then looks like the one in Figure 5.
Squares identify actors with positive desires. Circles identify actors with
positive beliefs. And, black dots identify actors with positive desires and pos-
itive beliefs. They are the ones who act because they believe that the action
will bring about the desired outcome. The white areas of the graph consist of
actors who neither believe in the efficacy of the action nor desire the result,
and therefore they do not act. In the figure 40 percent of the actors have pos-
itive desires, 40 percent have positive beliefs, and accordingly about 16 per-
cent act because they are the ones who have positive beliefs and desires.
A social structure is introduced into the analysis by assuming that each
actor directly interacts with the four neighbours described in Figure 6.
If a majority of these four neighbours have a different belief than the focal
actor, the focal actor’s belief will change. Otherwise it will remain the same.
The desires of the actors evolve according to the same logic. Thus, there will
be two parallel contagion processes at work, one operating on the beliefs of
5. A positive belief thus means that the actor believes that the action is a good, efficient, and/or
appropriate mean of attaining the desired result.
Figure 5. Initial patterns of beliefs, desires and actions in a population of 2,500 actors. Each cell
describes the current state of an actor’s DBA-triplet.
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these two processes6.
Although the point of departure is an entirely random state-of-nature pat-
tern, the interaction process quickly leads to a lock-in on a highly clustered
and segregated pattern. Figure 7 is a typical example of the type of pattern that
emerges; in this case the actors have interacted for 40 rounds.
6. The lattice used here is a so-called torus, i.e., a lattice which is wrapped around itself in
such a way that actors positioned at the borders of the lattice have neighbours on the other
side of the lattice. Hence all actors have the same number of neighbours. It is assumed that
all actors update their desires and beliefs at the same time.
Figure 6. The structure of social interaction between Ego and Alters.
Figure 7. Typical patterns of beliefs, desires and actions in a population of 2,500 actors who
socially interact with four neighbours.
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tern indeed is a typical one in the sense that it contains islands of desires and
islands of beliefs that occasionally overlap and then lead to actions. Since there
are no intrinsic differences between the actors located in different regions of
this social space, this example shows that social-interaction processes, in and
of themselves, can explain social differentiation, that is to say, the tendency of
different groups to spontaneously organize themselves into social clusters
with different beliefs, desires, and/or actions.
Previously I discussed the logic of two intra-individual mechanisms, wish-
ful thinking and the sour-grape syndrome. Wishful thinking, as noted above,
denotes a causal connection from an actor’s desires to his/her beliefs that makes
the actor believe what (s)he desires to be the case. In terms of DBA triplets,
this means that a <1,0,0> triplet will be transformed into a <1,1,0> triplet.
But since actors act when they believe that an action will bring about a desired
outcome, this pattern will be further transformed into a <1,1,1> triplet. The
sour-grapes syndrome, as noted above, is a causal connection from an actor’s
beliefs to his/her desires, which makes the actor desire only what (s)he believes
(s)he can get. In terms of DBA triplets, this means that a <1,0,0> pattern will
always be transformed into a <0,0,0> pattern. Figure 8 shows how these two
mechanisms influence social outcomes like these.
The computational models that generated these results were the same as
before, with the exception that 20 percent of the actors were exposed to wish-
ful thinking and 20 percent to the sour-grapes syndrome. While the previous
analyses revealed that approximately 5 percent of the actors acted when they had
interacted and influenced one another for forty rounds, the introduction of
some «wishful thinkers» and some «sour grapes» into the population, changes
these proportions to 10 and 4 percent respectively.
As compared to the effect of the wishful-thinking mechanism, the simu-
lation results reported in Figure 8 reveal that the sour-grapes mechanism has
a rather marginal impact on the extent to which the actors act. At first sight
it may seem surprising that the sour-grapes mechanism has any effects what-
soever on action, since the change from <1,0,0> to <0,0,0> does not repre-
sent any change in action —the third entry of the triplet is equal to zero in
both cases. The change in the actor’s desires brought about by the sour-grapes
mechanism may, however, influence the desires of those with whom the actor
interacts and thereby alter their actions. In this respect there is a subtle but
important difference between the wishful-thinking and the sour-grapes mech-
anisms. While the former mechanism has a direct effect on the focal actor’s
actions and an indirect effect on the actions of others, the latter mechanism
has only an indirect effect on the actions of others.
The results presented so far thus show that social interaction processes as well
as the details of the intra-individual mechanisms can have a profound impact
on the social patterns that emerge. What I have tried to illustrate with these
analyses is how a combination of mechanism-based theories of action and
interaction, and agent-based computational models makes it possible to ana-
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actions are the product as well as the producer of large-scale social change.
The importance of empirical calibration
Let me then move from the purely theoretical and virtual to the at least some-
what more real. How can we use models like these to explain specific empiri-
cal events or processes? In order to convince someone that a particular type of
mechanism explains an observed social pattern, it is not sufficient to demon-
strate that a particular mechanism can bring about the pattern. Many different
mechanisms can generate the same outcome so the fact that we observe a social
outcome compatible with a specific mechanism is not particularly strong evi-
dence in its support. We also need to show or make probable that it indeed
was this particular mechanism that was at work.
Furthermore, societies are not closed systems. We must always allow for
the possibility that various events, external and unrelated to the processes
focused upon in the analysis, influence the outcomes we seek to explain.
Observed outcomes typically are the result of many different processes operating
in parallel, and it certainly would be useful to know whether the processes we
focus upon also operate as we assume them to do when we control for the
importance of other types of processes and events. In order to accomplish these
tasks we need to reduce the gap between the theoretical model and the empir-
ical reality, and we can do this by empirically calibrating the model.
To clarify what I have in mind, I will use data on youth unemployment in
the Stockholm metropolitan area to calibrate these models. As shown in Åberg,
Hedström and Kolm (2003), social-interaction processes are highly important
for explaining unemployment durations. The outcome focused upon here
Figure 8. Summary of simulation results. Each bar is an average based on 500 simulations.
Basic Wishful thinking Sour Grapes
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these types of models because an individual’s possibilities of leaving unem-
ployment also are the result of other individuals’ actions, not the least the
actions of employers. For the theoretical and methodological points I wish to
make here, however, this type of data is perfectly fine.
The data set contains information on all 20- to 24-year-olds who ever lived
in the Stockholm metropolitan area during the period from January 1993 to
December 1999. Since the process being analyzed here unfolds over time, and
since the outcome event of interest —leaving unemployment— is a discrete
event, the statistical model being used is a so-called discrete-time event histo-
ry model (see Allison 1982). This type of model essentially is a regular logis-
tic regression model where the unit of analysis has been changed from persons
to ‘person-weeks’. All in all 87,924 individuals experienced some unemployment
during this time period, and they contributed a total of 2,463,079 person-
weeks. These person-weeks are our units of analysis. In addition to the lagged
unemployment level among neighbourhood peers, the model includes a num-
ber of covariates, such as the number of job vacancies in the region, gender,
age, education, and ethnicity7. The results are described in Table 3.
The variable of interest here is the unemployment level among neigh-
bourhood peers, and the extent to which this variable is related to the focal
individual’s propensity of leaving unemployment. For an average individual
these results imply the social-interaction effects described in Figure 9. The
graphs show that the probability of an unemployed individual leaving unem-
ployment is considerably influenced by the unemployment level among neigh-
bourhood peers, also when all the covariates of Table 3 are taken into account.
We can use these results to empirically calibrate the type of agent-based
model used above. This allows us to examine the social outcomes likely to be
brought about when we base the analysis on a more plausible model of the
extent to which the agents influence one another. If we assume, as before, that
the actors’ action opportunities are such that they can be in only one of two
mutually exclusive states, the first regression model of Table 3 says that the
probability that an actor will change state/action at a specific point in time is
given by the expression:
(1)
where Ujt-1 equals the proportion of the neighbourhood peers who were in the
same state or acted in the same way as the focal actor at the previous point in
7. The Stockholm metropolitan area is divided into 699 so-called SAMS areas and these serve
as my definition of a neighbourhood. The SAMS areas have been defined so as to contain
socially homogeneous residential areas. See Hedström (2005) for a detailed description of
the data.
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unemployment: Regression coefficients, with z statistics in parentheses.
Model 1 Model 2
Unemployment level among neighbourhood -4.086 -2.087
peers (at the end of the preceding week) (82.99) (-33.59)
Woman 0.132
(25.98)
Age -0.023
(-9.74)
Vocational training 0.027
(3.83)
High school education 0.137
(20.16)
College education 0.206
(21.71)
Immigrant from eastern Europe -0.138
or former Soviet Union (-8.40)
Immigrant from Middle East or Africa -0.192
(-18.84)
Immigrant from the rest of the world -0.014
(-1.53)
Less than 3 years in Sweden -0.455
(-27.64)
3 – 5 years in Sweden -0.044
(-3.28)
Married -0.034
(-2.76)
No. of children -0.055
(-6.16)
Previous unemployment -0.019
experiences (no. of weeks/10) (-19.12)
Number of unemployed per vacant job -0.034
(at the beginning of the month)/100 (-0.24)
Length of current unemployment 0.319
spell (no. of weeks/10) (65.40)
Square of the length of current -0.045
unemployment spell (-51.26)
Constant -2.085 -2.145
(363.35) (33.69)
Annual and monthly dummy No Yes
variables included
Log likelihood -644312.97 -627468.57
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peers that acted in the same way as the focal actor, the less likely it was that
the actor would change action.
In order to examine the social patterns that emerge when agents’ actions
are decided on the basis of this rule, we proceed in the same manner as before.
We assume that 2,500 actors are placed on a lattice (torus) with fifty rows and
fifty columns. We start with an entirely random action pattern and then we
examine the social patterns that emerge when the agents interact and influ-
ence one another. One important difference between these analyses and those
presented above is that we now focus on the actions as such and not on the
underlying beliefs and desires of the actors. It would have been desirable to
include beliefs and desires in the analysis but we do not have any empirical
information about them.
A typical initial action pattern looks like the upper-left graph of Figure 10.
Black areas identify actors who acted in one way (call their action a B-action),
and white areas identify those who acted in the other way (call their action a
W-action). In the simulation reported in Figure 10, 40 percent of the actors per-
formed a B-action and 60 percent performed a W-action at the outset of the
analysis.
Once again, we take social interactions into account by assuming that the
actors are directly influenced by their four immediate neighbours (see Figure 6).
These neighbours influence the focal actor’s probability of changing his/her
8. The results of these analyses can be interpreted as either referring to the states in which the
actors are or in terms of their actions. To simplify the presentation, hereinafter the results
are presented in action terms.
Figure 9. Estimated strength of the social interaction effect for an average unemployed
individual.
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under these conditions typically look like those in Figure 10. Although we
start with an entirely unstructured social pattern, a highly segregated pattern
emerges rather quickly. Already when the actors have interacted and influ-
enced one another over five rounds, segregated patterns start to emerge. As
the interaction process proceeds, the extent of clustering and segregation
increases.
Obviously, some of the social-interaction effects assumed in these analy-
ses are not proper interaction effects but are due to individual heterogeneity.
If we did not control for such differences, we would overestimate the extent
to which individuals are influenced by others. This was the reason that I
included a set of control variables in the second regression model in
Table 3.Using the social-interaction effect estimate from the second regres-
sion model to calibrate the agent-based model and holding all the other vari-
ables constant at their mean values, brings about the type of social outcomes
described in Figure 11.
Also in this case there are clear segregation and clustering tendencies, but
they are not of the same magnitude as in the previous set of analyses, and the
social patterns that emerge look rather different. These analyses hence show
that social-interaction processes can bring about highly segregated social pat-
terns also when the agents act on the basis of plausible assumptions about the
Figure 10. Typical action patterns in a population of 2,500 actors who socially interact with four
neighbours on the basis of an empirically calibrated action rule.
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level predictions are to the way in which social-interaction effects are estimat-
ed. Taking other events and processes into account considerably influences
the social outcomes predicted by the model.
Performing analyses like these allow us to not only state that a social-inter-
action process might have been of importance, but they allow us to state with
some confidence that such processes actually were at work and they give some
indication of how important they were for the social outcome we seek to
explain. Being able to make such claims, I believe, is essential for the future
of theoretical micro-macro modelling in an empirically oriented discipline like
sociology.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have tried to illustrate the various components involved in an
explanation of social change. The analytical approach adopted here seeks to
closely integrate mechanism-based theories of action and interaction, and
agent-based computational modelling. The core of the approach can be sum-
marized in the following way:
9. Bruch and Mare (2004) found that the use of plausible probabilistic decision rules in a tra-
ditional Schelling (1971) model of residential segregation did not generate the highly seg-
regated patterns that Schelling models normally generate. Bruch and Mare discussed whether
their finding could be generalized to social-influence processes more generally. These results
suggest that they cannot.
Figure 11. Typical action patterns in a population of 2,500 actors who socially interact with four
neighbours on the basis of an empirically calibrated action rule with controls for confounders.
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assumed to be operative. Develop an agent-based model that emulates the
operation of these mechanisms. Simulate the model in order to examine
generative sufficiency (Epstein and Axtell 1996), that is, make sure that the
model can generate the type of social outcome to be explained. If the model
exhibits generative sufficiency, we have a mechanism-based explanation of
the outcome, but the explanation has not yet been empirically verified.
— For empirical verification, use relevant data to examine the most impor-
tant bits and pieces of the causal machinery in order to verify that the
mechanisms actually work as postulated.
— Examine generative sufficiency when the agent-based model has been mod-
ified in the light of (2) and after controls for likely confounders have been
introduced.
Only when our explanatory account has passed all of these three stages can
we claim to have an empirically verified mechanism-based explanation of a
social outcome.
In this article I used five basic theoretical concepts ––desires, beliefs, oppor-
tunities, actions, and relations–– and I sought to express more complex mol-
ecular mechanism in terms of combinations of these basic entities and activi-
ties. Obviously the basic vocabulary may need to be extended, but it is important
to try to avoid the current embarrassment of the riches as far as sociological
concepts are concerned. We must try to find a basic theoretical vocabulary,
consisting of a small number of fundamental concepts in which complex
processes can be expressed and analyzed, and this vocabulary must be firmly
anchored in our theories of action and interaction.
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